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Abstract
This paper describes the security weaknesses of a recently proposed secure commu-
nication method based on chaotic masking using projective synchronization of two
chaotic systems. We show that the system is insecure and how to break it in two
different ways, by high-pass filtering and by generalized synchronization.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a considerable effort has been devoted to extend the chaotic
communication applications to the field of secure communications. The pos-
sibility of synchronization of two coupled chaotic systems was first shown by
Pecora and Carrol [1,2,3] and opened the possibility of using the signals gen-
erated by chaotic systems as carriers for analog and digital communications.
This discovery soon aroused great interest as a potential means for secure
communications [4]. Accordingly, a great number of cryptosystems based on
chaos have been proposed [5,6,7,8,9], some of them fundamentally flawed by
a lack of robustness and security [10,11,12,13,14,15,16].
Projective synchronization (PS) is an interesting phenomena firstly described
by Mainieri and Rehacek [17], it consists in the synchronization of two par-
tially linear coupled chaotic systems, master and slave, in which the amplitude
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of the slave system is a scalar multiple, called scaling factor, of that of the
master system in the phase space. The original study was restricted to three-
dimensional partially linear systems. Later Xu and Li [18] showed that PS
could be extended to general classes of chaotic systems without partial linear-
ity, by means of the feedback control of the slave system; they illustrated the
applicability to Lorenz, Chua and the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler systems.
In a recent paper Li and Xu [19] proposed a secure communication scheme
based on PS chaotic masking. The authors claimed that the unpredictabil-
ity of the scaling factor of the PS can additionally enhance the security of
communications. Furthermore, the authors proposed the use of an invert-
ible function F , in such a way that the transmitted ciphertext signal will
be U(t) = x1 + F [x1, y1, z1, m(t)], where x1, y1 and z1 are the variables of a
three-dimensional chaotic system and m(t) is the plaintext (which in their
paper is assumed to be a sound signal). They claimed that the security of the
information can also be guaranteed because the function F could be arbitrar-
ily chosen. They illustrated the feasibility of the scheme with two examples,
based on the Lorenz and the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler systems, respecitvely.
In this article we show that the proposed cryptosystem is insecure and how
to break it in two different ways, by high-pass filtering and by generalized
synchronization, for both examples based on the Lorenz and the hyperchaotic
Ro¨ssler systems.
In [19], the first example is based on the following Lorenz system:
x˙1 = σ(y1 − x1), (1)
y˙1 = (µ− z)x1 − y1, (2)
z˙1 = x1y1 − ρz1. (3)
with parameter values {σ, µ, ρ} = {10, 60, 8/3}. The transmitted signals from
the sender to the receiver end are the shared scalar variable z1 and the ci-
phertext U(t) = x1 +F [x1, y1, z1, m(t)], where the function F was specified as
F [x1, y1, z1, m(t)] = y1 +m(t).
The second example is based on the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler system defined by
the authors as:
x˙1 = −y1 − z1, (4)
y˙1 = x1 + a y1 + w1, (5)
z˙1 = b+ x1z1, (6)
w˙1 = c z1 + dw1. (7)
with parameter values {a, b, c, d} = {0.25, 3,−0.5, 0.05}. In this example, the
transmitted signals from the sender to the receiver end are the shared scalar
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variable w1 and the ciphertext U(t) = x1+F [x1, y1, z1, w1, m(t)], where F was
specified as F [x1, y1, z1, w1, m(t)] = y1 +m(t).
2 Loose system key specification
Although the authors seem to base the security of its communication system
on the chaotic behavior of the output of a chaotic or hyperchaotic non-linear
system, no analysis of security was included. Instead, an unproved assertion
saying that “the security of information can be guaranteed” was given in the
conclusion.
The first issue to be considered is the key of the system. A cryptosystem cannot
exist without a key, otherwise, it might be considered as a coding system, but
never regarded as a secure system. In [19] it is not considered whether there
should be a key in the proposed system, what it should consist of, what the
available key space would be, and how it would be managed.
When cryptanalyzing a cryptosystem, the general assumption made is that the
cryptanalyst knows exactly the design and working of the cryptosystem under
study, i.e., he knows every detail about the ciphering algorithm, except the
secret key. This is an evident requirement in today’s secure communications
systems, usually referred to as Kerchoff’s principle [20].
In [19] it was stated that the arbitrary selection of the function F will warrant
the information security. But according to the Kerchoff’s principle, the func-
tion F must be publicly known and may not be considered part of the key.
At most, its structure could contain some factors or constants whose values
can play the role of secret key; but, unfortunately, the authors of [19] have not
considered such possibility, nor which conditions the function F might satisfy,
nor how many usable functions there are, nor how much they can contribute to
the system security. Much care must be exercised when selecting the function
F . Otherwise, choosing different functions might create different ciphertexts,
that can be decrypted using the same algorithm though, as shown in Sec. 4.
3 Inefficiency as a masking system
It is supposed that chaotic masking is an adequate means for secure transmis-
sion, because chaotic systems present some properties as sensitive dependence
on parameters and initial conditions, ergodicity, mixing, and dense periodic
points. These properties make them similar to pseudorandom noise [21], which
has been used traditionally as a masking signal for cryptographic purposes.
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Fig. 1. Encrypted transmission of a plaintext of amplitude 0.2 and frequency 16.352
Hz, by masking with the Lorenz system described in [19]: (a) logarithmic power
spectrum of the ciphertext; (b) retrieved plaintext by high-pass filtering of the
ciphertext.
A fundamental requirement of the pseudorandom noise used in cryptography
is that its spectrum should be infinitely broad, flat and of much higher power
density than the signal to be concealed. In other words, the plaintext power
spectrum should be effectively buried into the pseudorandom noise power spec-
trum. The cryptosystem proposed in [19] does not satisfy this condition. On
the contrary, the spectrum of the signal generated by the Lorenz oscillator is
of narrow band, decaying very fast with increasing frequency, showing a power
density much lower than the plaintext at plaintext frequencies.
In [19] the sound of a water flow was used as the plaintext message m(t), but
no details are given about its waveform or power spectrum. From [19, Fig. 2]
it can be appreciated that its amplitude is roughly 0.2. In our simulation we
have used, instead, a well defined plaintext signal m(t) = sin(2 pi 16.352 t),
which corresponds to a pure tone sound of 16.352 Hz, which is the lowest note
generated by a musical instrument, the C0 of a 32 ft pipe of a pipe-organ
[22,23] and with the same peak amplitude of [19, Fig. 2], namely 0.2.
Figures 1(a) and 2(a) illustrate the logarithmic power spectra of the ciphertext
when the Lorenz attractor and the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler attractor are used as
the chaotic system, respectively, with the same parameter values previously
described.
It can be seen that in both examples the plaintext signal clearly emerges at
16.352 Hz over the background noise created by the Lorenz and hyperchaotic
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Fig. 2. Encrypted transmission of a plaintext of amplitude 0.2 and frequency 16.352
Hz, by masking with the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler system described in [19]: (a) logarith-
mic power spectrum of the ciphertext; (b) retrieved plaintext by high-pass filtering
of the ciphertext.
Ro¨ssler oscillators, with a power of −40 db and −50 db, respectively, relative
to the maximum power of the ciphertext spectrum, while the power density of
the ciphertext, at neighboring frequencies, falls below −80 db and −125 db,
respectively.
To recover the plaintext we did not use a chaotic receiver, instead the cipher-
text was high-pass filtered. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) and 2(b).
The filter employed was a finite impulse response one. To avoid phase non-
linearities and distortion, it was constructed with a 512-coefficient Hamming
window, with a cutoff frequency of 13 Hz. The result is a good estimation of
the plaintext after a short initial transient of approximately 0.3 seconds for the
Lorenz system. Note that this is the hardest case an attacker can face from
the point of view of plaintext frequency, because for higher sound frequen-
cies the spectrum of the background noise created by the Lorenz oscillator is
even lower. While for the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler system the result is a perfect
recovery after a short initial transient of approximately 0.1 seconds.
4 Generalized synchronization attack
The former attack method works only for plaintext frequencies higher than the
13 Hz cut-off frequency of the high-pass filter employed. For very low plaintext
frequencies the noise created by the chaotic oscillators effectively masks the
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plaintext, preventing its retrieval by direct high-pass filtering. But plaintext
signals of very low frequency may be still retrieved if we know what kind
of non-linear time-varying system was used for encryption, but without the
knowledge of its parameter and initial condition values. To show such a possi-
bility we have implemented two cryptanalysis procedures based on generalized
synchronization [24,25,26,27].
4.1 Breaking the Lorenz system
To break the PS-based chaotic masking scheme under study, using the Lorenz
system, we use the following intruder receiver:
x˙2 = σ
∗(y2 − x2) + p ε, (8)
y˙2 = (µ
∗ − z)x2 − y2 + q ε. (9)
where {σ∗, µ∗} are the intruder receiver’s Lorenz system parameters and ε is
the instantaneous value of the recovery error ε = U(t) − (x2 + y2) = m(t) +
x1+y1−x2−y2. The terms p ε and q ε work as feedback of the recovery error,
in order to achieve generalized synchronization between sender and receiver;
p and q are two scalars that may accept a wide range of values, from 1 to
more than 400, and even one of them alone may not exist. The synchronism
is achieved for any combination of p and q values, but the amplitudes of x2
and y2 do not match with those of x1 and y1 while σ
∗ 6= σ or µ∗ 6= µ.
By making p = σ∗ Eq. (8) is simplified, becoming independent of y2, hence not
depending upon the adjustment of µ∗. In this way x1 = x2 whenever σ
∗ = σ,
regardless of the value of µ∗. Also we have found experimentally that the
best results for fast convergence of the synchronism and minimum recovery
error are obtained when q =
√
σ∗. With those settings our intruder receiver is
redefined as:
x˙2 = −2σ∗x2 + σ∗U(t) (10)
y˙2 = (µ
∗ −√σ∗ − z)x2 − (1 +
√
σ∗)y2 + σ
∗U(t). (11)
Figure 3 illustrates the synchronization mechanism between sender and in-
truder receiver. The values of the the sender parameters are {σ, µ} =
{10, 60} and the initial conditions of the sender and receiver are:
{x1(0), y1(0), z1(0), x2(t), y2(t)} = {0, 0.2, 30, 20, 1}. Figure 3(a) shows the first
8 seconds of the plot of the sender variables z1 vs. x1. Figure 3(b) shows
the plot of the sender variable z1 vs. the intruder receiver variable x2 when
{σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 80}; comparing (a) and (b) it can be seen that both phase
portraits are identical, after the short initial transient originated by the dif-
ferent initial conditions. Figure 3(c) shows the plot of the sender variable x1
6
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Fig. 3. Generalized synchronization of the Lorenz attractor: (a) plot of the sender
variables z1 vs. x1, for {σ, µ} = {10, 60}; (b) plot of the sender variable z1 vs. the
intruder receiver variable x2, for {σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 80}; (c) plot of the sender variable
x1 vs. the intruder receiver variable x2, for {σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 80}; (d) plot of the sender
variable x1 vs. the intruder receiver variable x2, when {σ∗, µ∗} = {40, 80}. The ini-
tial conditions in all cases were: {x1(0), y1(0), z1(0), x2(0), y2(0)} = {0, 0.2, 30, 20, 1}.
vs. the intruder receiver variable x2, when {σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 80}; it can be seen
that the phase and amplitude of x2 match exactly those of x1, after the initial
transient, although µ∗ 6= µ. Finally, Fig. 3(d) shows the plot of the sender
variable x1 vs. the intruder receiver variable x2, when σ
∗ and µ∗ completely
differ from σ and µ, revealing that both systems are synchronized, although
their amplitudes and phases do not match exactly.
We have estimated and recorded the logarithm of the mean value of the
squared error ε2, i.e. the error power, for the range of the intruder receiver
system parameter values σ∗ and r∗ that give raise to the chaotic behavior of
the Lorenz attractor, with the same transmitter system parameters of the nu-
merical example presented in [19, Fig. 2] and the intruder receiver described
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Fig. 4. Relative logarithmic representation of the mean of the error power ε2, for
σ∗ = {5, 7.5, 10, 20, 30, 40} as a function of µ∗.
by Eqs. (10) and (11). The results are presented in Fig. 4. The mean of ε2
is computed along the first 1.5 seconds, after a delay of 0.5 seconds to let
the initial transient finish. It is clearly seen that the error grows monoton-
ically with the mismatch between the transmitter and receiver parameters
{|σ∗ − σ|, |µ∗ − µ|}, and that the minimum error corresponds to the receiver
system parameters values {σ∗, µ∗} exactly matching the transmitter system
parameters values {σ, µ}.
The parameters value recovery procedure consists of the straightforward search
for the minimum recovery error ε. Once the correct values {σ∗, µ∗} = {σ, µ}
are found, the term x1 + y1 − x2 − y2 vanishes and the recovery error is just
equal to the plaintext signal m(t).
The search of the correct parameter values {σ∗, µ∗} can be done in the fol-
lowing way: first, select an initial value for σ∗ centered in its usable range;
second, vary the value of µ∗ until a minimum error is reached; third, keep this
value and vary the value of σ∗ until a new minimum error is reached; four,
check if the remaining error ε is a clean recognizable plaintext, if not repeat
the second and third steps. Note that this method retrieves all at once the
correct values of σ∗, µ∗, and the plaintext.
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5, for a plaintext m(t) = cos(2pi4t), whose
frequency is so low that it cannot be retrieved by the previously described
direct high-pass filtering method. When the initial parameter values are chosen
at random as {σ∗, µ∗} = {16, 70}, the corresponding error reaches a peak value
near 70. Then the µ∗ value is varied until a minimum of the error is found for
µ∗ = 60, it can be seen that now the peak error value after the initial transient
is reduced to about 15. Next, the σ∗ value is varied until a new error minimum
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Fig. 5. Plaintext and parameter recovery of the Lorenz system by generalized syn-
chronization analysis; the transmitter parameters are {σ, µ, ρ} = {10, 60, 8/3}: (a)
plaintext m(t) = cos(2pi4t); (b) receiver error for unadjusted intruder receiver pa-
rameters {σ∗, µ∗} = {16, 70}; (c) receiver error for partially adjusted intruder re-
ceiver parameters {σ∗, µ∗} = {16, 60}; (d) receiver error for correct intruder receiver
parameters {σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 60}; (e) receiver error for correct intruder receiver pa-
rameters {σ∗, µ∗} = {10, 60}, and unadjusted function F = −0.7x1+0.3, y1+m(t).
is reached for σ∗ = 10, now the error is reduced to the plaintext itself, plus
some noise of reduced amplitude that may be easily removed by a high-pass
filter, if necessary.
We have found that our method woks as well for the whole family of func-
tions of the form F = (h − 1) x1 + h y1 + m(t), were h is a scalar of any
value. The plaintext m(t) is correctly recovered for any ciphertext of the form
U(t) = x1 + F [x1, y1, m(t)]. This fact demonstrates that a great care must be
exercised when selecting the function F , because some changes in its factors
and constants values may be useless to enlarge the key space, hence not im-
proving the system security at all. In Fig. 5(e) a time story of the retrieved
message for a function of the form F = −0.7 x1 + 0.3, y1 +m(t) is presented,
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when decoded by an intruder receiver adjusted to recover a function of the
type F = y1+m(t). It can be observed that the only difference with Fig. 5(d)
is the magnitude and duration of the initial transient.
4.2 Breaking the hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler system
To break the PS-based chaotic masking scheme under study, when the hy-
perchaotic Ro¨ssler system is used to generate the masking signal, we follow a
similar procedure to the one used in the preceding section. Now the intruder
receiver is:
x˙2 = −y2 − z2 + p ε, (12)
y˙2 = x2 + ay2 + w1, (13)
z˙2 = b+ x2z2. (14)
were p is a scalar. We have found the best results with p = 10.
Here the instantaneous value of the recovery error is defined as ε = U(t) −
(x2 + y2) = m(t) + x1 + y1 − x2 − y2. When the synchronism is reached it
happens that x1 + y1 = x2 + y2, hence the error is ε = m(t), thus allowing the
exact recovery of the plaintext.
Figure 6 illustrates the plaintext recovered for various intruder receiver pa-
rameter values sets, being the plaintext m(t) = cos(2pi2.5t), whose frequency
is so low that it cannot be retrieved by the previously described direct high-
pass filtering method. It can be observed that the intruder receiver is quite
insensitive to the values of the parameters {a∗, b∗} and the structure of the
function F . In Fig. 6(b) it is shown that when the parameter values of sender
and intruder receiver do not match at all, the plaintext is still visible, although
a residual interference is present, but its intensity is not big enough to preserve
the confidentiality of the communications. This interference can be easily re-
moved, if desired, by trial and error in few steps. The first parameter to be
adjusted is a∗, because it is the most influent on the shape of the retrieved
waveform. In Fig. 6(c) it is shown the waveform for a∗ correctly adjusted while
b∗ is kept unadjusted. Then the parameter b∗ must be adjusted until a clean
recovered plaintext waveform is reached, as illustrated in Fig. 6(d).
We have tested several different invertible functions F as building blocks of the
sender ciphertext, and it has been observed that quite different functions allow
for the almost correct retrieving of the plaintext. Figure 6(e) dramatically
illustrates this fact: when a function as complicated as F = 26+0.5
√
y1+m(t)
is used for transmission, while maintaining an intruder receiver designed for
decoding a function of the type F = y1+m(t), together with a total parameter
mismatch between sender and receiver as {a, b, a∗, b∗} = {0.25, 3, 0.4, 20}, we
10
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Fig. 6. Plaintext and parameter recovery by generalized synchronization anal-
ysis; the sender parameters are {a, b, c, d} = {0.25, 3,−0.5, 0.05}: (a) plaintext
m(t) = cos(2pi2.5t); (b) receiver error for unadjusted intruder receiver parameters
{a∗, b∗} = {0, 0}; (c) receiver error for partially adjusted intruder receiver parame-
ters {a∗, b∗} = {0.25, 0}; (d) receiver error for the correct intruder parameter values
{a∗, b∗} = {0.25, 3}. (e) receiver error for wrong intruder receiver parameter values
{a∗, b∗} = {0.25, 3}, and unadjusted function F = 26 + 0.5√y1 + cos(2pi2.5t).
can see that the retrieved waveform still retain enough plaintext information
to completely compromise the security of the communication.
5 Other weaknesses of the proposed system
The knowledge of the scaling factor α is not required to retrieve the plaintext, if
a high-pass filter attack or a generalized synchronization recovering procedure
are implemented, as we did. Hence the scaling factor does not add any strength
to the system security, as opposed to the claims by the authors of [19].
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Thanks to the plain transmission of the shared scalar variables z1, or w1,
inherent to the PS scheme, the third Lorenz system parameter ρ and the
hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler parameters c and d need not be determined to recover
the plaintext when using a generalized synchronization receiver, in opposition
to other cryptosystems that make use the Lorenz or hyperchaotic Ro¨ssler
systems as a masking signal. Therefore an additional advantage is offered by
the authors of [19] to the opponent eavesdropper.
6 Conclusion
In summary, the proposed PS-based chaotic masking cryptosystem is rather
weak, since it can be broken in two easy ways, the first one being ignorant of
the transmitter precise structure and the second one knowing the transmitter
structure but ignoring its parameter values. The alleged security advantage
of the cryptosystem based on the eavesdropper lack of knowledge of the scal-
ing factor α is incorrect, its knowledge is completely irrelevant to retrieve
the plaintext. The function F does not clearly enhance the security, owing to
the fact that a wide range of different functions generate ciphertexts equally
breakable with the same intruder receiver with a unique parameter adjust-
ment. There is no mention about what the key is, nor which is the key space,
a fundamental aspect in every secure communication system. The total lack of
security discourages the use of this communication scheme for secure applica-
tions, unless some modifications are made to essentially enhance its security.
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